Why would federal prisoners want to file petitions for habeas corpus under section 2241 rather than file motions under section 2255? The reason is that Congress imposed a litany of draconian conditions on prisoners' ability to challenge their convictions under section 2255. 5 For example, prisoners generally have one year from the time their conviction becomes final to file a motion under section 2255. 6 The restrictions on successive motions under section 2255 are especially severe. 7 If a prisoner has already filed one post-conviction motion, she may file another only in two circumstances-one, if newly discovered evidence "establishe[s] by clear and convincing evidence" that the defendant is not "guilty of the offense," and 5. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2255; id. § 2244. 6. Id. § 2255(f). 7. Prisoners must obtain permission from a panel of the court of appeals that the would-be successive motion satisfies these requirements. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A)-(B) (2012); id. § 2255(h). Section 2255 (like section 2244(b)) requires a prisoner, before filing a second or successive application, to obtain a ruling from a panel of the court of appeals that the conditions have been satisfied. Id. § 2255(h). It does not, however, explicitly say that the court of appeals' decision to grant or deny authorization to file a successive motion cannot be appealed by way of a petition for rehearing or for certiorari. Id.; see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1360 n.7 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 7th ed. 2015). Contra § 2244(b)(3)(E). But courts have either held or operated on the understanding that section 2255's prefatory clause incorporates section 2244(b)(3)(E)'s prohibition on petitions for certiorari or rehearing. See, e.g., In re Clark, 837 F.3d 1080, 1082 (10th Cir. 2016); In re McCall, 826 F.3d 1308, 1311-12 (11th Cir. 2016) (Martin, J., concurring) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E)) ("Most troubling, these orders 'shall not be appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition for rehearing or for a writ of certiorari.' Of course, when we grant an application, the prisoner can file his motion, and it will then be subject to adversarial presentation and the normal appeal process. But when we deny an application, that prisoner gets no further consideration of his sentence. 15 ACCA subjected defendants who were convicted of being felons in possession of a firearm to a mandatory minimum term of fifteen years' imprisonment. 16 Without ACCA, these defendants were only eligible for up to ten years' imprisonment. 17 Johnson, therefore, meant that some defendants were sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment when the statute under which they were convicted said they could be sentenced to no more than ten years. 18 Before April 2016, the Supreme Court had never applied Johnson to a case on collateral review (i.e., to a case that had become 8. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2). The requirements for federal prisoners are slightly different in that federal prisoners do not need to establish the newly discovered evidence could not have been obtained through diligence. final). 19 Some courts, therefore, held that prisoners who had already filed one motion under section 2255 could not file a successive motion under section 2255, even though these prisoners' sentences were at least five years longer than they could lawfully be.
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Section 2241 does not contain any of the same limitations on challenging a conviction or sentence. 21 Hence, prisoners who are barred from challenging their conviction or sentence under section 2255 because of its restrictions may try to challenge their convictions or sentences under section 2241.
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Congress explicitly allowed some prisoners to do just that in section 2255. Section 2255(e) provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention. Unsurprisingly, the courts of appeals have come up with different interpretations of the scope of section 2255(e). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that section 2255(e) allows prisoners to file motions under section 2241 when a subsequent decision has changed the relevant substantive criminal law. 29 That would occur when a court has interpreted the statute under which the defendant was convicted such that the defendant did not actually commit an act that the law made criminal. For example, say a defendant was convicted for "using a firearm," and the court later holds that "using a firearm" means firing it. If the defendant was convicted because he juggled the firearm, he would have been convicted for an act that the law did not actually make criminal. That defendant could not apply for relief under section 2255, because his claim relies on a decision of statutory interpretation, rather than a constitutional rule. 30 But the Fourth Circuit would allow him to challenge his conviction under section 2241. 31 The Seventh Circuit similarly allows defendants to challenge their sentences under section 2241 when a subsequent decision of statutory interpretation means that the defendant was wrongfully subject to a higher, mandatory sentence.
32 Prisoners who were wrongfully sentenced under ACCA could challenge their sentences under section 2241 because they would have been sentenced to at least fifteen years when the statute, properly interpreted, sentenced them to at most ten years. And the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits allow defendants to resort to section 2241 under similar circumstances, although they frame the test in somewhat different terms-prisoners can use section 2241 when they rely on a new, substantive claim that was previously foreclosed by circuit precedent. 33 
37 Judge Gorsuch's approach would not allow any of the previously mentioned prisoners to challenge their convictions or sentences under section 2241-prisoners who were convicted of acts the law did not make criminal; prisoners who were sentenced above the statutory maximum for their offense; or prisoners whose convictions or sentences violated some substantive rule of constitutional law. 38 Ooph. Judge Gorsuch gave several reasons for interpreting section 2255(e) this way. One, the statute's text described the prisoner's "remedy," which Judge Gorsuch thought referred to the processnot substanceof section 2255 proceedings, and included only the "opportunity to bring [an] argument," rather than to win it. 39 Two, when Congress enacted section 2255, "it was surely aware that prisoners might seek to pursue second or successive motions based on newly issued statutory interpretation decisions," but Congress did not allow those kinds of claims to be raised in successive motions. 40 Three, several surrounding provisions emphasize "providing a single opportunity to test arguments, rather than any guarantee of relief or results."
41 Four, section 2255 was enacted to allow federal prisoners to challenge their convictions and sentences in the district where they were sentenced, rather than only in the district where they were incarcerated. 42 It was not "adopted to expand or 'impinge upon prisoners' rights of collateral attack upon their convictions,' but only to address the 'difficulties that had arisen in administering' habeas corpus." 43 I'll start with what I like about the opinion-it's a fun read. I also think Judge Gorsuch is right to think that Congress had to know, in some general sense, that prisoners would try to challenge their convictions by asserting new constitutional rules or new decisions of statutory interpretation in successive motions. 44 And the successive motions that Congress authorized do not include those kinds of claims. 45 So, the argument goes, Congress could not have meant to allow these prisoners to challenge their convictions or sentences via section 2241. 46 Judge Gorsuch's interpretation of section 2255(e) also avoids "plenty of knotty . . . legal questions about" how to apply the other circuits' more openended standards for when prisoners can resort to section 2241. 47 Some circuits permit prisoners to challenge their convictions under section 2241 based on a new decision of statutory interpretation because Congress made no allowance for statutory claims in the provision authorizing successive motions under section 2255. 48 But does that mean Congress "forgot" about statutory claims, or that it did not want to authorize statutory claims at all? That same question comes up in any case where a prisoner is not permitted to file a successive motion under section 2255. 49 Did Congress merely forget about those prisoners, or did Congress intend to foreclose those prisoners' ability to rely on section 2241? Judge Gorsuch's was-there-an-actual-courtto-hear-your-initial-section-2255-claim rule is a lot more administrable than 40 [Vol. 115:67 approaches that differentiate between different kinds of claims, and that is a big mark in its favor.
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My concern, however, is that a lot of tests would be administrable. It would be pretty easy to administer an interpretation of section 2255 that said defendants who filed Mondays through Thursdays couldn't resort to section 2241; it would also be pretty easy to administer a test that said no one could. But no one thinks that's what section 2255(e) means, and Judge Gorsuch's opinion does not expend a lot of effort to address some of what (I think) makes interpreting section 2255(e) a harder question than the opinion suggests, or to try and come up with an administrable rule that isn't quite so . . . draconian.
Start with the text: Judge Gorsuch's opinion says that section 2255(e) means a prisoner can resort to section 2241 when the sentencing court literally isn't there to hear a prisoner's initial section 2255 motion. 51 The problem is that section 2255(e) specifies that section 2255 may be inadequate or ineffective even where the sentencing court does hear a prisoner's initial section 2255 motion and rejects it. 52 The provision refers to when "the court which sentenced [the prisoner] . . . denied him relief"-in other words, where the sentencing court actually heard the prisoner's initial section 2255 motion.
53 I'm not sure those words mean his analysis is wrong, but it would have been nice if his opinion acknowledged them.
Judge Gorsuch maintained that section 2255(e)'s reference to the "remedy" referred to the process of challenging the prisoner's conviction, not the outcome of that process. 54 But the Court has used "remedy" to refer to the result a plaintiff obtained by filing suit, not just the process applicable to different kinds of lawsuits. 55 And as a verb, "remedy" means to set something right; as a noun, it can mean the fix for that something (e.g., the result).
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I'm also not that convinced by the more purposivist moves that Judge Gorsuch's opinion made, many of which sound in the idea that the relevant statute generally restricts prisoners' ability to file successive motions. He's right that, in light of the restrictions on successive motions, "[f]ederal prisoners seeking to take advantage of new rulings of constitutional magnitude that would render their convictions null and void are not always allowed to do so."
57 But so what? That just means they cannot all be allowed to challenge their convictions or sentences under section 2241; it does not mean that some of them can't be permitted to. The restrictions on federal courts' review of state criminal convictions are not especially relevant because they embody concerns about federal review of state judgments. 58 And the provision that says the ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel shall not serve as a ground for relief, section 2254(i), likewise is limited to section 2254, which governs state prisoners, rather than section 2255, which governs federal prisoners. 59 In any case, the Supreme Court has held that the provision bars federal courts from relying on post-conviction counsel's performance as a basis to overturn the prisoner's conviction; it does not bar federal courts from relying on counsel's performance as a bypass to procedural restrictions on post-conviction review, including statutory ones.
60 Prisoners seeking to rely on section 2255(e) are trying to do just that-get around procedural restrictions using post-conviction counsel's performance.
It's also not clear that section 2255's restrictions on successive motions are evidence that section 2255(e) was not intended to provide a safe harbor for prisoners who are barred by the restrictions on successive motions. The restrictions on successive motions, codified at section 2255(h), 61 were enacted several decades after section 2255(e) 62 ; they therefore do not say much about the scope of section 2255(e). 63 Even if Congress had in mind certain difficulties with habeas when it enacted section 2255(e), it used much broader language than something that might limit the provision to prisoners who had difficulty "comply[ing] with § 2255's new venue mandate."
64 And there's a decent argument that the savings clause could function as a [Vol. 115:67 backstop in the event that section 2255's restrictions on successive motions are declared invalid. 65 Prost might just be limited to Prost. But, for me, it raises some broader concerns. The statutes governing post-conviction review are notoriously unclear and shoddily drafted, and they accordingly raise a lot of difficult interpretive questions. 66 I'm wary of any approach that gets fed up with these difficulties and relies instead on the intuition that the statutes were intended to restrict, rather than expand, post-conviction review. Even if that general claim is right, it does not follow that every interpretive uncertainty should be resolved against habeas petitioners, especially when the consequences are so severe, as they were in Prost.
Judge Gorsuch's concern about the limiting principle, or administrability of the other courts of appeals' interpretations of section 2255(e), also rings a bit hollow to me. Many issues that the Supreme Court addresses raise difficult questions about what limiting principle there is to the Court's doctrine-including what rights not specifically enumerated in the text of the Constitution are enforceable in court or what limits there are on Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce. The answer cannot be that all interpretations or doctrines that raise administrability concerns are necessarily suspect. Judge Gorsuch certainly does not believe this. In some of his recent writings, Judge Gorsuch has indicated that he is willing to revisit longstanding doctrines about judicial deference to administrative agencies based on constitutional principles like the separation of powers, which are amorphous and vague, and thus difficult to administer in a principled way.
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If legal uncertainty is not a reason for judges to hold back in the separation of powers domain, why is it a reason to do so in criminal law, where so much is at stake?
Finally, it's worth noting what claim the petitioner in Prost was trying to raise. The petitioner in Prost was arguing that his money-laundering conviction was invalid in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Santos v. United States, which narrowly interpreted the federal money-laundering statute. 68 The plurality opinion in Santos was written by Justice Scalia, the Justice that Judge Gorsuch would replace. Justice Scalia used Santos to reaffirm his view that ambiguities in criminal statutes should be resolved in favor the defendant. 69 That rule of interpretation applies only to substantive criminal statutes that define offenses and sentences, not remedial statutes that say when a conviction can be challenged. But Prost still makes one wonder about what a Justice Gorsuch would mean for criminal justice at the Supreme Court. Many of the Court's opinions that rule in favor of government officials on criminal justice issues do so by narrowing what remedies are available to raise criminal procedure claims, which is exactly what Judge Gorsuch did in Prost. And if the Court continues to chip away at these remedies, the underlying rights will start disappearing too. 70 
